Industrial Policy in the 21st Century by Chang, Ha-Joon & Andreoni, Antonio




Industrial Policy in the 21st Century 
 






Industrial policy is back at the centre stage of policy debate, while the world is 
undergoing dramatic transformations. This article contributes to the debate by 
developing a new theory of industrial policy, incorporating some issues that have 
been neglected so far and taking into account the recent changes in economic reality. 
The authors explore how the incorporation of some of the neglected issues — 
commitments under uncertainty, learning in production, macroeconomic management 
(especially demand management), and conflict management — changes the theory. 
They then examine how the theory of industrial policy should be modified in light of 
recent changes in economic reality: the rise of the global value chain, financialization 
and new imperialism. This contribution aims at promoting a pragmatic approach to 
industrial policy and pointing to new areas for policy intervention in a changing 
world. 
  





Over the last decade, the perception of industrial policy has experienced an 
unanticipated turn. After the very heated debate from the late 1970s to the mid-1980s, 
prompted by the success of Japanese and other East Asian industrial policy practices, 
the debate on industrial policy had lapsed into three decades of ideologically 
motivated wilful neglect (see Chang, 2011, for a review of the early debate). In spite 
of significant progress in our theoretical and empirical knowledge in the area, 
‘industrial policy’ became a phrase that one did not utter in polite company. 
Unexpectedly, however, industrial policy is now back in fashion, both in academia 
but also, more importantly, in the real world.  
In academia, while the vast majority of mainstream economists are still at best 
sceptical and at worst downright hostile towards industrial policy, prominent 
mainstream (neoclassical) economists like Joseph Stiglitz, Dani Rodrik and Justin Lin 
have openly come out in favour of industrial policy. Although these economists are 
very careful not to deviate from the neoclassical framework and often emphatically 
distance themselves from the old-style industrial policy, especially tariff protection, 
the mere fact that they have explicitly supported industrial policy has opened the 
possibility for the debate to be far less ideological and thus more productive (see Lin 
and Chang, 2009 for an example of a less ideological debate).   
In the real world, since the 2008 financial crisis many leading economies have 
become more willing to recognize the value of industrial policy and have taken 
measures to strengthen it — the USA and Germany are the most prominent examples 
(Andreoni, 2016; Mazzucato, 2013). Following the end of the China-driven 
commodity boom, many developing countries, which had been busy dismantling their 
industrial policies during the 1980s and the 1990s, have realized that they need 
industrial policy if they are to upgrade their economies. Many middle-income 
countries in Asia and some in Latin America now talk of industrial policy as a tool to 
overcome the ‘middle-income trap’ (see Felipe, 2015; Noman and Stiglitz, 2016). The 
oil economies in the Gulf region have started talking about industrial policy as a tool 
for economic diversification (Cherif and Hasanov, 2014). Even the African 
economies talk about it in their attempt to get out of poverty (Chang et al., 2016; 
Kanbur et al., 2019; Noman and Stiglitz, 2015). 
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Given these recent changes, a new, less ideologically charged debate on 
industrial policy is urgently needed. This article aims to contribute to this effort 
neither by revisiting the classic debate on industrial policy of the 1990s centred 
around the East Asian ‘miracle’,1 nor by comprehensively reviewing the increasing 
number of contributions on industrial policy which have developed along the 
structuralist, evolutionary and developmentalist traditions.2 Instead, we identify and 
develop lines of investigation which either have been neglected or sit uncomfortably 
within the resurgent industrial policy debate, despite their relevance. This is done in 
two ways.  
First, we discuss a number of issues which cannot be accommodated within the 
neoclassical framework and which are also often neglected by evolutionary and 
structuralist contributions — namely, commitment under uncertainty, learning in 
production, macroeconomic management, and conflict management. Evolutionary 
economics may have improved our understanding of the role of uncertainty in the 
innovation process, but it has rather neglected the issues of irreversible investment 
commitments under uncertainty and learning in production (as opposed to research 
and development [R&D]). Similarly, while structuralist contributions have 
highlighted the linkage between the macro economy and the meso-industrial 
dynamics of structural change, few of them incorporate macroeconomic policy in 
their discussions of industrial policy. Finally, neither evolutionary nor structuralist 
contributions pay much attention to the political economy dimension of economic 
change and thus neglect the role of the state in managing the conflicts that arise from 
the process of change. 
Second, we address new challenges for industrial policy makers in a changing 
world, such as the shifting organization of global production, the increasing 
financialization of the world economy, and changes in the rules of the global 
economic system. In selecting these three topics we do not claim to be exhaustive. 
Rather, this selection reflects the importance we accord to power dynamics in our 
                                                          
1 For a review of the Asian Miracle debate see Amsden (1989); Chang (1994, 2011); Cimoli 
et al. (2009); Lin and Chang (2009); Rodrik (2008); Wade (1990). 
2 For a review of the debate since 2000, see Andreoni and Chang (2019); Cherif and Hasanov 
(2019); Mazzucato (2013); Salazar-Xirinachs et al. (2014); Stiglitz and Lin (2013); Wade 
(2018). See also five recent journal issues covering frontier themes in industrial policy: 
Andreoni et al. (2019b); Foray et al. (2012); Kattel and Mazzucato (2018); Pianta and Zanfei 
(2016); Storm (2017). 
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framework. Power dynamics affect the creation, capture and distribution of value 
along global value chains (GVCs); they define the ability of governments to resist the 
anti-production pressure coming from financialization; and they determine the policy 
space that countries have by affecting the structure and the management of 
multilateral, regional and bilateral economic arrangements. These three sets of power 
dynamics have a second-order effect on some of the most pressing industrial policy 
issues of our time. In particular, the sustainability and inclusiveness of 
industrialization will depend on how the power relationships that exist between firms 
(the global value chain), between finance capital and productive capital 
(financialization), and between countries (global governance) affect the abilities of 
firms and governments to make their developments more sustainable through a 
greening transition and to make them more inclusive by creating sufficient numbers 





Since the mid-2000s, a number of important theoretical arguments in favour of 
industrial policy have re-entered the economic policy debate. However, many other 
issues have remained largely neglected, mainly because they do not fit easily into the 
mainstream (neoclassical) view of the world — in particular its limited understanding 
of two issues: production, and the role of the state. Neoclassical economics sees 
production as a mechanical process (as expressed in the production function) and 
overlooks the fact that it requires commitment of resources under uncertainty and 
continuous learning (Andreoni and Chang, 2017). Moreover, discussions of industrial 
policy in the neoclassical framework have failed to recognize the importance of 
managing macroeconomic conditions, on the one hand, and social conflicts, on the 
other hand, in the successful conduct of industrial policy. In this section, by exploring 
these two sets of neglected issues, we also challenge the ongoing ‘mainstreaming of 
industrial policy’ (for a critical analysis. see Andreoni and Chang, 2019), while 
providing suggestions on how to incorporate these neglected issues in structuralist, 
institutionalist and evolutionary theories of industrial development.  
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Commitment under Uncertainty 
 
One central characteristic of modern industrial economies is that production requires 
irreversible commitments. Most of these involve physical capital that embody certain 
technologies (including energy systems) and that cannot be remoulded in any 
significant way to embody other technologies. Very often the commitments are also 
organizational — to particular types of internal organizational forms (e.g., vertical 
integration, diversification) or particular types of long-term relationships with 
suppliers (e.g., the Japanese just-in-time, or JIT, delivery system). Even at the 
individual level, workers often have to commit themselves to particular skills, which 
may be valuable only in a narrow range of industries — or even in just one industry 
or, in the extreme case, even just in one firm. These irreversible commitments are 
made because they raise productivity, but the problem is that they make subsequent 
changes costly. Once a firm commits to a particular technology, it cannot switch to 
another technology without big costs — even when changes in the environment are 
such that the firm would have adopted another technology, if it were making the 
choice ab initio. 
Of course, if we could predict the future perfectly at least in the probabilistic 
sense (as we are assumed to do in neoclassical theory), commitments and the 
consequent difficulties of making changes would not be a problem. In this case, based 
on our knowledge of the likelihood of each possible future state of the world, we 
could decide exactly what degree of commitments we were going to make, by 
balancing the gains from productivity increase (discounted over time) with the loss 
from the inability to make the necessary changes in response to changing conditions 
(also discounted over time). The trouble is that the world is highly uncertain and this 
kind of calculation is impossible.  
Naturally, firms can — and do — do things to reduce the uncertainty of their 
environment. One classic method is for a firm to increase its control over the market 
by reducing the number of rivals through predatory pricing (thereby driving some out 
of business) or through mergers and acquisitions (Richardson, 1960; Singh, 1971). 
Another common method is to form cartels, although they are not easy to form and 
maintain due to the well-known ‘free-rider’ problem. Third, firms can try to reduce 
uncertainty by increasing controls over their suppliers, either by becoming larger and 
thus increasing bargaining power (the Walmart solution) or by deliberately forming 
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long-term relationship through investments and technical supports (the Toyota 
solution). Last but not least, firms try (and often succeed) to control the tastes of 
consumers by spending money on advertising and brand building. 
However, there are also things that individual firms cannot do but industrial 
policy makers can do, in order to reduce uncertainty. The motive of the policy maker 
in reducing uncertainty for firms would be to encourage the making of productivity-
enhancing investment commitments as well as steering innovation. A number of 
industrial policy tools reduce uncertainty by guaranteeing demand. First, infant 
industry protection not only enables the infant firms to survive and continue learning 
but it significantly reduces demand uncertainty for them, by restricting competition 
from superior foreign producers, which have much greater ability to create 
uncertainty in the market through radical technological innovations than domestic 
(infant) rivals do. Second, the government can guarantee demand by restricting 
competition among domestic firms. For example, it can give monopoly rights to a 
particular firm, subject entry into certain industries to government licensing, or allow 
— or even facilitate — cartels in specific industries to fix prices (especially in the 
export market) and/or divide up the market. Japan and Korea have used these 
measures particularly effectively (Chang, 1994: Ch. 3). Third, the government can 
reduce demand uncertainty by giving preferential treatment in government 
procurement to domestic firms so that they have stability in demand. The US aircraft 
industry, the Japanese mainframe computer industry, and the Finnish electronics 
industry are some of the most prominent examples of industries that have benefited 
hugely from such treatment. More recently, government procurement has played an 
important role in the development of green energy technologies, such as solar panel 
and wind power, in a number of countries (Rodrik, 2014).  
At the more dynamic level, industrial policy makers can introduce measures that 
reduce uncertainty about the future evolution of technology — rather than reducing 
the uncertainty about market demand, supply of inputs, and the strategies of the rivals, 
given the technology. First of all, the government can provide a clear platform for 
technological evolution of an industry by taking a lead in the development of the 
basic technologies. The best example in this regard is the US government, which 
initially financed the developments of technologies for the computer, the internet, the 
semi-conductor, etc. through public funding of R&D (Berger, 2013; Block and Keller, 
2011; Mazzucato, 2013). Second, the government can push firms to form research 
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consortia to develop basic technologies, which they will share and use in developing 
more applied technologies, with which they will compete with each other. The 
developments of Japanese mainframe computers and of US semi-conductors 
(SEMATECH) benefited from such an arrangement. Third, during the early stage in 
the development of an emerging industry, where different technological standards 
compete with each other, the government can reduce uncertainty about the path of 
future technological evolution by imposing a technological standard. This was done in 
South Korea in relation to the CDMA (code-division multiple access) mobile phone 
technology standard, which it adopted on a national scale ahead of other countries, 
including the US, whose company Qualcomm developed the technology first. Fourth, 
the government can subsidize or directly provide technology-related ‘public goods’ 
(such as data, metrology, prototyping and testing facilities) in order to reduce the risk 
involved in the scaling-up of emerging technologies. Several technology 
intermediaries such as the Fraunhofer in Germany or the National Network for 
Manufacturing Innovation in the US (Andreoni, 2016; Tassey, 2007) provide such 
services. 
Of course, policies to reduce uncertainty can fail. If the government reduces  
uncertainty in an industry by restricting competition, this can (although it does not 
have to) lead to lower productivity in the long run by making the firms concerned 
complacent. Especially in relation to long-term technological evolution, policy 
makers should be aware that industrial policy measures which try to reduce 
uncertainty run the risk of prematurely ending the competition between different 
technological standards and/or backing what turns out to be a ‘wrong’ technology 
with lower innovation potential in the long run.  
However, the possibility that industrial policy measures to reduce uncertainty 
may turn out to be counter-productive should not be used as an excuse to recommend 
policy inaction. Even if we don’t know everything — and, more importantly, don’t 
even know exactly what we don’t know — it does not mean that we do not know 
anything and therefore cannot and should not take any action. All that we are arguing 
is that policy makers need to be aware of the limitations of their policies and 
acknowledge that they need to constantly review the situation. In fact, in advanced 
industrial nations, a number of governments are engaged with the private sector in 
road-mapping exercises aimed at identifying future societal needs and global 
challenges, on the one hand, and the emerging technologies which will help us meet 
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them, on the other hand (e.g. green technologies, new mobility solutions, robots for 
the ageing society). By developing a joint vision as well as credible expectations 
among private companies around future public investments, not only does the 
government reduce the uncertainty faced by companies but it also enables the creation 
of new markets. 
 
 
Learning in Production 
 
The promotion of learning, understood as a process of development and accumulation 
of productive capabilities, is perhaps the ultimate goal of industrial policy. In our 
view, the most fundamental difference between industrialized and non-industrialized 
economies is the difference in the levels of various collective productive capabilities 
embedded in the institutions and productive organizations in the two types of 
economies — what Moses Abramovitz (1986) originally called ‘social capabilities’. 
The continuous development of these collective capabilities through learning is what 
drives productivity increase, creates employment, and sustains redistributive 
institutions such as the welfare state.  
The recognition of the role of learning in driving industrialization and broader 
increase in the wealth (and power) of nations dates back to pre-classical (Antonio 
Serra and Giovanni Botero) and classical political economists (Adam Smith, Charles 
Babbage and Karl Marx). It also provided the most fundamental foundation to the 
‘infant industry argument’ (Alexander Hamilton and Friedrich List) (see Andreoni 
and Chang, 2019; Chang, 2002; Reinert, 2007). Since the 1970s, development and 
evolutionary economists have assembled a wealth of research on capabilities building 
and innovation dynamics, starting from this recognition (Dosi et al., 1988; Freeman, 
1974; Lall, 2001; Mazzucato, 2018). More recently the so-called ‘product space’ 
method has attempted an operationalization of the concept of capability and 
diversification (Hidalgo and Hausmann, 2009), while Schumpeterian analyses of 
catching-up have explained successful industrialization in terms of learning cycles 
and innovation (Lee, 2013, 2019).  
Despite these advancements, in the current industrial policy debate learning 
has become increasingly disconnected from production. This is partly because 
scholars have de-linked production and innovation dynamics from each other — as if 
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an economy does not need to produce to be innovative. But it is also because 
productive capabilities have been treated as black-box concepts. This is so in two 
senses. First of all, productive capabilities are discussed without much reference to 
the ‘realities’ of concrete production processes — that is, how the deployment of 
productive capabilities is affected by things like properties of materials used, the 
scales and time horizons of the production process, bottlenecks in the process, etc.  
Secondly, productive capabilities are discussed without much appreciation of the fact 
that innovation is exactly about discovering different technological and organizational 
solutions to problems arising in particular production processes. 
The failure to recognize that ‘learning in production’ is the ultimate driver of 
industrial dynamics, especially innovation dynamics, is reflected in the dominant 
innovation policy paradigms since the 2000s — for example, by the ‘Lisbon Agenda’ 
in Europe (for a critique see Soete, 2007), and the neglect of production in the 
discussion of the innovation economy in the US (for a critique see Pisano and Shih, 
2013; Tassey, 2014). The failure to recognize the importance of ‘learning in 
production’ is also found in debates on new technologies. For example, the debate 
around digitalization is dominated by the idea of a leap into a post-industrial age, 
without the realization that manufacturing processes and the materiality of production 
will still matter in such an economy. For another example, it is claimed that robotics 
and automation will destroy a dramatic number of jobs in the near future, without 
realizing that firms have been learning how to effectively deploy automated solutions 
to complement, rather than simply replace, labour. 
In the current debate on industrial policy, the dominant view is that innovation 
is mainly generated by ‘R&D units’, such as public research institutes (e.g., 
universities) and the R&D (not the production) departments of companies. In this 
view, once new technologies are developed, they can be deployed almost 
automatically by any firm with more than the minimum absorption capacity. Given 
the public-good nature of this knowledge and, thus, the risk of underinvestment in 
R&D (or in education or in skills development), the best way to promote learning 
(and innovation) is to give firms intellectual property rights (possibly complemented 
by some public investments in knowledge creation or R&D subsidies). In this 
framework, poor production performances are understood as a problem of 
underinvestment in knowledge inputs, such as R&D and education, while de-
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industrialization or offshoring are not seen as negatively affecting learning, as 
production is not where learning happens.  
Recently, a few scholars have highlighted the importance of production in 
sustaining learning and innovation, even in the advanced economies (e.g. Andreoni et 
al., 2018; Berger, 2013; Locke and Wellhausen, 2014;  Tassey, 2014). In this 
production-focused view, learning is a collective and cumulative process embedded in 
existing production structures, involving continuous and interdependent changes in 
agents’ capabilities, organizational configurations, and investments in material assets, 
including machinery and infrastructure (Andreoni, 2014; Chang, 2010; Lazonick, 
1990, 2009; Penrose, 1959; Richardson, 1972). These interdependent changes, 
constituting what we call here ‘learning in production’, entail much more than the 
standard ‘learning by doing’ of individual workers (Arrow, 1962). In fact, learning in 
production is at the very core of the innovation process, especially in those 
manufacturing industries where the manufacturability of new products is the most 
critical step in the innovation chain, running from R&D through manufacturing to 
commercialization.  
Learning in production is mainly triggered by three supply-side (or 
technology-pull) mechanisms and two demand-side (market-pull) mechanisms, and 
involves reconfiguration of production at the shop-floor level as much as at the level 
of the industrial ecosystem (Andreoni, 2014, 2018; Rosenberg, 1979, 1982). In terms 
of the first technology-pull mechanism, learning in production includes the 
opportunity to adopt similar technical and organizational solutions to production 
problems across different products, firms and sectors. For example, the adoption of a 
certain machine or of a particular organizational technique can affect a whole range of 
different sectors, from textile to automotive and aerospace, as has been the case with 
lean manufacturing or with advancements in particular production technologies, such 
as precision engineering and composite materials.  
Second, the existence of indivisibilities — and thus the need to solve ‘scale 
bottlenecks’ — in production may lead to organizational innovations, not just in the 
industry itself but through the whole value chain in which the industry is embedded. It 
may also enable the adoption in the supplier industries of technologies with high fixed 
costs that had not been adopted due to limited production volume. As Kaldor put it, 
‘[w]ith every enlargement of production, new “activities” become profitable which 
would have not been employed earlier, whist the introduction of such new “activities” 
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leads to the invention of further “activities” which have not been known earlier’ 
(Kaldor, 1972: 1255). 
Third, as ‘inventions hardly ever function in isolation’ (Rosenberg, 1979: 26), 
any changes in the existing production processes and structures induce changes in 
complementary products and processes and technologies within and across firms. For 
example, innovation in the materials used for a certain component can induce changes 
in the overall product architecture and/or in the nature of other components.  
In terms of the market-pull mechanisms, learning in production is driven by 
changes in the ‘quantity’ of demand (both final and intermediate demands of 
commodities) as well as its ‘quality’ (or composition). First, the interaction with final 
consumers in different markets is a key driver of learning; they are responsible for 
various processes of ‘learning by using’ (Rosenberg, 1982: 122). Second, market-pull 
dynamics are often mediated by the demands for intermediate industrial goods. The 
increasing specialization of firms in a limited number of production tasks and/or 
production of intermediate goods leads to the expansion of the market for 
intermediate goods and, in turn, for additional/complementary investments. 
Specialization of one firm, and the resulting productivity gains, then promotes the 
expansion of demand from other firms. These external economies are often associated 
with the advantages of geographically ‘localized learning’, based on local supply–
demand relationships, entailing ‘technological pollination’ and other forms of 
learning in production, within an industrial ecosystem (Andreoni, 2018).  
In the last couple of decades, much emphasis has been put on ‘smart’ 
industrial policies that encourage knowledge generation (investments in education and 
R&D), as against those clumsy, traditional policies that provide protection and 
subsidies. However, once we recognize the importance of learning in production, we 
begin to see that no amount of ‘smart’ policies will generate innovation without those 
‘dumb’ policies that keep firms in business and help them expand, improve and 
innovate their production activities.  
Indeed, the East Asian ‘miracle’ economies have shown that industrial policy is 
most successful when it combines measures to help firms produce more (e.g., trade 
protection, subsidies, state-led restructuring of failing enterprises, export promotion) 
with measures to help them acquire and generate new knowledge. Moreover, when it 
comes to the latter measures, successful countries did not just invest in education and 
R&D but also in knowledge-generating activities that are more closely linked to 
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production activities, such as worker training and publicly provided technological 






The industrial policy debate has historically had a supply-side bias.3 This supply-side 
bias is responsible for the tendency for industrial policy scholars to overlook the 
influence of demand management on the conduct of industrial policy, both 
domestically (through monetary and fiscal policies) and internationally (especially 
through exchange rate policy). This tendency, in turn, has led to the neglect of the 
impacts that changes in demand (sometimes deliberately managed by the government) 
have on different sectors and on different countries in terms of diversification, 
specialization and restructuring (Imbs and Wacziarg, 2003). 
While a number of classical development scholars like Young and later 
Hirschman (1958, 1977) have pointed to the role of demand for intermediate goods 
across vertically disintegrated sectors and consumption linkages, they implicitly 
assumed that the economic system is able to adjust automatically to rising supplies. 
However, according to Kaldor (1972: 1249–50), the absorption of a continuously 
rising volume of production depends on ‘additional incomes resulting from the 
accumulation of capital (in other words, from investment expenditures) combined 
with the induced character of such investment’. According to Kaldor, for the income 
multiplier and the investment accelerator mechanisms to be effective, the banking 
system as well as what he calls the ‘merchants’ have to play critical roles. The 
banking sector enables capital investments which, in turn, generate the ‘savings–
additional investments–savings’ dynamics, while the merchants operate as counter-
cyclical forces absorbing stocks in response to excess supply, and releasing stocks in 
the face of excessive demand. 
One obvious macroeconomic policy that has a direct bearing on industrial 
policy is the interest rate policy. High (real) interest rates discourage investments in 
                                                          
3 Gilboy (1932) was an early critic of this bias; for more recent attempts to analyse the 
macroeconomics of industrialization see Fischer (2015); Nissanke (2019); Ocampo et al. 
(2009); Storm (2017). 
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general, but have more negative impacts on investments in the manufacturing sector, 
where the requirement for borrowing is greater due to higher capital requirements, 
than in other sectors. We have vividly seen the negative impacts of high interest rates 
on the manufacturing sector in countries like Brazil and South Africa in the last 
couple of decades, with real interest rates frequently being around 10–12 per cent and, 
as a consequence, few firms being able to borrow to invest.  
Interest policy may not be an ‘industrial policy’ issue in the conventional sense, 
but it has important bearings on industrial policy insofar as high interest rates 
disproportionately damage capital-intensive industries. The effect of high interest 
rates on such industries can be, and often has been, countered by industrial policy 
measures — selective provision of cheaper loans (or priority in lending) by state-
owned banks (e.g., Brazil’s BNDES) or by private banks subject to the government’s 
directed credit programmes (e.g., Japan). However, it is very difficult to have lively 
investments when interest rate policy is such that firms cannot make enough profits to 
repay even the interest on their loans. 
The relationship between industrial policy and macroeconomic management 
does not stop at the domestic front. It also has an international dimension. And in the 
management of foreign demand — the so-called ‘foreign trade multiplier’ — the 
management of the exchange rate becomes crucial. Overvalued currencies may be 
created by the ‘Dutch disease’ (a sudden inflow of export earnings from a natural 
resource bonanza that is not countered by macroeconomic policy) or by the bias of 
policies towards the financial sector. Overvalued currencies tend to more negatively 
affect export industries, especially manufacturing industries, although different 
sectors tend to be affected in different ways according to the price elasticities of 
demand of their export products. Those products whose elasticity of demand in the 
global market is lower tend to be affected less than those with high elasticity. Once 
again, the effects of overvalued currency can be countered to an extent by industrial 
policy. For example, over the last couple of decades, the BNDES in Brazil has tried to 
counter the effects of overvalued currency by extending subsidized credit to selected 
industries.  
Exchange rate policy can also be complemented in a positive way by other 
internationally oriented demand management policies, affecting balance of payments 
and trade performances. Among these, there may even be policies that are ‘micro’ in 
their conduct but have important macroeconomic consequences that have impacts on 
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industrial policy. These are policies that relieve the balance of payments constraints in 
developing countries. In these countries, once such constraints are relaxed, there can 
be more investments (as investments mostly rely on imported capital goods). If this 
happens in a country with strong industrial policy, the impacts of such relaxation will 
be magnified. One important example is the control imposed on the imports of luxury 
consumption goods by the governments of Japan and Korea in the earlier days of their 
economic development — in the 1950s and 1960s in Japan and between the 1950s 
and the mid-1980s in Korea (on this, see Chang, 1998). Such control enabled these 
countries to invest more by relaxing their balance of payments constraints which, 
when combined with their highly selective industrial policies, enabled the investment 
and thus the expansion of selected industries. 
 Thus seen, it is very important for governments to align the multitude of 
interrelationships between traditional industrial policy instruments and 
macroeconomic policies. This need was highlighted by Kaldor, who stated that: ‘the 
failure of post-war Governments [in the UK] to pursue a policy consistent in terms of 
its declared objectives could thus be primarily attributed to an insufficient 
orchestration of instruments — of not having enough separate policy instruments at 
hand to secure the simultaneous attainment of the various objectives’ (Kaldor, 1971: 
3). Interestingly, this ‘orchestration of instruments’ was one of the reasons for the 
East Asian economic successes (Chang, 2010; Stiglitz, 1996), but few contributions 
have so far looked at this policy alignment and synchronization between industrial 
and macroeconomic policies (for some exceptions, see Andreoni and Chang, 2019; 





All economic policies are in the end political actions, in the sense that they are partial; 
they favour one group over another, one ideology over another, or even one culture 
over another.4 Being political, all policies inevitably involve conflicts, at least in 
                                                          
4 In the literature some scholars use the concept of rents to refer to those income- or value-
capture opportunities which are created by policies or regulations when they allocate some 
entities or groups the right to do something, e.g. an import licence, a subsidy, preferential 
access to credit, etc. 
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latent forms. And depending on the way in which conflicts are addressed (and 
eventually resolved, or not), policies have different distributional effects. In the case 
of industrial policy, its ‘inclusiveness’ depends on the extent to which it constructs 
new (or steers existing) ‘productive coalitions’ that are willing to invest in the 
enhancement of collective productive capabilities, including the welfare state (see 
below) and are, over time, willing to engage in a more equal distribution of the value 
generated through these investments. Therefore, successful implementation of any 
policy requires management of the conflicts that it causes and/or of existing latent 
conflicts that it unintentionally stirs up.  
 It is important here to note that ‘leaving things to the market’ is also a very 
particular type of conflict management strategy. This method compels the losers from 
a market-driven change to accept the market outcome, thereby clearly taking the side 
of the winners of the change process. When the adjustments that need to be made by 
the losers are large, leaving things to the market may create a lot of conflicts, and 
therefore may be viable only when the state can prevent the losers from organizing 
countervailing actions, such as industrial strikes (if the losers are workers in particular 
industries) or capital flight (if the injured party are the wealthy).  This is why a free 
market, somewhat paradoxically, requires a strong state (Gamble, 1987 Glyn, 2007).   
 When it comes to ‘policies’ in the conventional sense, as a rule, the more 
targeted the policy is, and thus the easier it is to identify the winners and the losers, 
the more immediately it is likely to provoke conflicts. This means that the more 
targeted policy is likely to require more conflict management. So, for example, fiscal 
policy is likely to require more conflict management than monetary policy does, as 
much of the former has clearer winners and losers than the latter. Given this, changes 
in fiscal policy require the government to make explicit deals with representatives of 
different groups of winners and losers or at least to present its fiscal policy with a 
high degree of obscurity so that people cannot easily tell who the winners and the 
losers are. Even monetary policy, which is often regarded as even-handed, requires 
conflict management, as it affects the outcome of distributional conflicts, as explained 
in the conflict theory of inflation by Rowthorn (1977). For example, a tight monetary 
policy is likely to favour capitalists over workers, as capitalists can more easily 
counter the impacts by raising their prices — although some small capitalists in 
highly competitive markets may not be able to do that, while some organized workers 
may be able to defend themselves by raising their wages. Further, a tight monetary 
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policy also favours financial capitalists over industrial capitalists, as the former tend 
to benefit from a stronger currency while the latter are forced to pay higher interest on 
their loans.  
 Having said all of this, it has to be admitted that industrial policy may be the 
most prone to open conflicts, as it tends to be more explicitly selective than other 
policies; it inevitably chooses between sectors, technologies, or even individual firms 
in the same industry. Therefore, conflict management is more important for industrial 
policy than for other policies, and ultimately defines the political economy of 
industrialization (for a review of seminal contributions see Andreoni and Chang, 
2019; Storm, 2017). 
 There are two types of measures that can be used in order to reduce conflicts 
involved in industrial policy: we call them ‘reactive measures of conflict 
management’ and ‘anticipatory measures of conflict management’. Reactive measures 
of conflict management in industrial policy can be subdivided into two categories, one 
temporary and the other permanent. When the trouble that a particular sector is 
experiencing is deemed to be of a temporary nature, the government can reduce the 
extent of conflicts in the sector by offering temporary protection and subsidies so that 
it can more easily weather the difficulties and perhaps restructure itself in the 
meantime. Temporary reactive measures of conflict management in industrial policy 
are rather widely used — even the World Trade Organization (WTO), which is not a 
fan of tariffs, allows its member countries to impose emergency tariffs in the face of a 
sudden surge in sectoral imports. 
 When the trouble that a sector is going through is deemed to be of a long-term 
nature, the government can impose, or offer inducements for, more radical 
restructuring. First, it can mediate negotiated capacity scrapping among firms in the 
sector, as the Japanese government did with the shipbuilding industry in the 1980s 
(Dore, 1986). Second, it can offer subsidies for the scrapping of obsolete machines 
and the purchase of new machines, as the South Korean government did with the 
textile industry, also in the 1980s (Chang, 1993). Third, it can bail out the enterprises 
in trouble, as the US government did with the auto industry after the 2008 financial 
crisis. Fourth, the government can nationalize an industry in trouble, with a view to 
winding it down (as in the case of the nationalization of the Swedish shipbuilding 
industry in the 1970s) or with a view to restructuring and eventually privatizing the 
(temporarily) nationalized firms (as in the case of Volkswagen in West Germany, in 
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the 1970s).  
The ‘reactive’ measures of conflict management have often been condemned 
for ‘picking losers’ and thereby preventing ‘natural selection’ in the market and 
reducing dynamism (see Lindbeck, 1981 for example). This may well be the case, but 
the critics of these measures disregard the fact that the failure to manage conflicts 
may impose serious costs on the economy. First, insofar as the sector in trouble 
possesses ‘specific assets’ that cannot be deployed in other sectors (or can be 
deployed only with a serious reduction in their values), bankruptcy of the firms in a 
sector that is viable in the long run will incur social costs. Second, if some owners of 
those specific assets can put up resistance, there also will be social costs. For 
example, if the capitalists in a sector with overcapacity refuse to exit in a game of 
‘chicken’, all firms in that sector will suffer with low profits and thus greater risk of 
bankruptcy. Likewise, if the workers in a sector resist changes because they own 
sector-specific skills, they will disrupt production in the short run (thereby increasing 
the chance of bankruptcy of their firms) and, more importantly, delay the inevitable 
restructuring in the long run. If we take into account these costs, it may be more 
efficient in the long term for the government to incur short-term costs to manage the 
conflicts arising out of the industrial restructuring process. 
The second type of measures of conflict management in industrial policy are 
‘anticipatory’, rather than ‘reactive’. A clear announcement of policy priorities and 
their justifications (why the government is backing particular sectors, technologies or 
even individual firms) in advance — through long-term national visions, 5-year plans, 
or long-term sectoral strategies — can help reduce the conflicts arising out of 
industrial policy. While such announcements cannot deny the accusation of 
‘favouritism’ per se, they can deflect accusations of corruption, clientelism, vote 
seeking, etc., to a substantial degree. Industrial policy measures will become 
politically even more acceptable if they are announced together with explicit 
performance targets, evaluation criteria and, where appropriate, a long-term plan to 
phase them out (e.g., infant industry protection or temporary technological upgrading 
programmes).  
 Anticipatory measures of conflict management can also take various forms of 
‘social insurance’ and thus reduce the incentives for the losers to resist socially 
beneficial changes that harm them. These are not industrial policy measures in the 
conventional sense, but they can play very important roles in the processes of 
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structural change that characterize the process of industrial development. The most 
important social insurances for capitalists are limited liability and the modern 
bankruptcy law (see Chang, 2002: Ch. 3 on the role of these institutions in industrial 
development). Limited liability caps the loss to what has been invested, thereby 
reducing the risk of business failure leading to personal ruin, as it did before the late-
19th century. The modern bankruptcy law reduces the cost of business restructuring 
by giving temporary protection from creditors and even making debt write-downs 
possible. It also wipes the slate clean for the failed capitalist and gives him/her a 
second chance. These measures not only encourage risk taking by capitalists ex ante, 
but they also reduce their resistances to restructuring ex post. 
The welfare state is the most important social insurance mechanism for 
workers. By ensuring a floor to living standards, the welfare state reduces the 
incentive for workers to resist restructuring of the industries in which they work. If 
this is combined with effective programmes for retraining and redeployment, as in 
countries like Sweden and Finland, this social insurance becomes even more effective 




NEW REALITIES (AND THE CONSEQUENT NEED FOR NEW THEORIES) 
 
In this section, we expand our theory of industrial policy by focusing on the new 
challenges. In particular, we focus our attention on three major transformations of the 
economic reality, which call for the development of a new industrial policy theory. 
These are: the new patterns of accumulation, value creation and capture; the 
financialization of the global economy; and finally, new forms of imperialism. 
 
 
New Patterns of Accumulation, Value Creation and Capture 
 
The global production landscape has been profoundly reshaped by three 
interdependent processes involving changes in: (1) the global organization of 
production; (2) the relationships between different sectors of the economy; and (3) the 
nature of technology systems. While each of these issues has received significant 
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amounts of attention, the relationships between them and their combined impacts on 
accumulation, value creation and value capture dynamics remain underexplored.  
The global business revolution and the emergence of global/regional value 
chains since the early 1990s have been made possible by a number of technological 
advances (e.g., falling transportation costs, more interconnectedness via ICTs), cost-
reduction opportunities associated with offshoring of labour-intensive manufacturing 
processes, and the increasing openness to trade and investments (Gereffi, 2014, 2018; 
Milberg and Winkler, 2013; Nolan, 2001; Ponte et al., 2019; Storm, 2015). For a 
number of emerging economies, the expansion of transnational corporations (TNCs) 
and the resulting global segmentation of production tasks have provided an 
unprecedented opportunity for entering technology-intensive industries and capturing 
value from advanced manufacturing technologies. Despite the fact that not only China 
but also South Korea and Taiwan started their industrialization by linking 
(backwards) to global supply chains in electronics and other sectors (Amsden, 1989; 
Chang, 1993; Lee, 2013; Wade, 1990), the industrial policy debate has only recently 
recognized the different opportunities and challenges that the evolving pattern of 
global division of labour is posing to catching-up economies.  
Among neoliberal scholars, under the mantra, ‘you need to import if you want 
to export’, GVCs have been used to re-emphasize the benefits of international trade 
and, thus, the need for more trade liberalization. Surprisingly, even the majority of the 
developmentalist scholars have welcomed the opportunity offered to developing 
countries by the GVC-based industrialization model in overcoming the highly 
uncertain and capital-demanding task of developing new sectors ab initio. However, 
we need to carefully analyse the conditions required for countries and companies to 
benefit from GVC integration as well as identifying the potential risks associated with 
this new industrialization model (Andreoni, 2019). 
First, TNCs are extremely powerful organizations, whose sizes can be 
comparable to the GDPs of many developing countries. These TNCs exercise their 
power in global oligopolistic markets. Nolan (2007) estimates that since 2000, in the 
majority of global industries, the market has been controlled by a handful of TNCs. 
This power is exercised in a systematic and strategic manner to capture value in the 
market, by creating entry barriers in the forms of patents, quality standards, 
copyrights, trademarks, etc. (what Kaldor called ‘institutional monopolies’), on the 
one hand, and by squeezing the suppliers, on the other hand. This is particularly the 
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case with commodity-based GVCs, where big companies capture value by controlling 
the retailing stages of the chains, or with low-tech manufacturing GVCs, where TNCs 
can squeeze value by inducing suppliers to increase scale and raise product quality 
and then, once resources are committed, exercising downward pressures on prices (the 
‘hostage situation’ described by Williamson, 1983).  
Second, the very act of committing resources to specific assets designed to 
perform relatively unsophisticated activities (basic processing or assembly), which 
developing countries are likely to engage in when they participate in GVCs, can limit 
the scope for learning in the future. The problem is that foreign-owned companies 
organizing GVCs create few backward and forward linkages because there are limited 
supplier and processor capacities in the host economy. Existing small enterprises lack 
the scale and the skills to provide reliable intermediate products as well as the 
resources necessary for investing in technological upgrading. The few domestic 
companies engaged in medium- and large-scale production are also constrained, as 
they largely rely on imports of semi-processed raw materials and capital goods to 
assemble relatively simple products, rather than creating backward and forward 
linkages. Breaking out of this low productivity, high cost and low value-added cycle 
requires policy intervention (for a discussion see Gereffi, 2018; Gereffi and Sturgeon, 
2013; Salazar-Xirinachs, et al., 2014). 
 The emergence of a global production system, and the consequent 
proliferation of offshoring practices, has gone hand in hand with the phenomenon of 
outsourcing, especially from the mature industrial economies. As a result, the 
traditional sectoral boundaries — especially those between manufacturing and 
services — have become increasingly fuzzy. While the literature has increasingly 
recognized the emergence of companies specializing in knowledge-intensive, 
production-related services and the consequent difficulty in drawing a boundary 
around the manufacturing sector, less emphasis has been given to the fact that, even 
within the manufacturing sector, the boundaries between different manufacturing 
industries have become blurred. In fact, production units (manufacturing firms) 
providing intermediate goods and components are often involved in different 
‘manufacturing processes’ that feed into different industries.  
Sectoral boundaries are also continuously challenged by technological changes. 
Technical innovations can change the nature of one sector, while technical 
innovations straddling different sectors can redefine the sectoral boundaries. The 
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problem is that standard classification of boundaries between sectors is mainly based 
on products, but they are better defined in terms of underlying production 
technologies and their linkages. As shown in Andreoni (2018), technological linkages 
among different manufacturing processes may be used to define ‘capability domains’, 
that is, domains of techniques, productive knowledge and production 
technologies/equipment that show a high degree of similarity and complementarity.  
With the blurring of sectoral boundaries, analyses at the level of capability 
domains are becoming more enlightening than analyses at the traditional sectoral 
level. A manufacturing process could be reconceptualized according to the 
underpinning capability domain. Different manufacturing processes could be then 
clustered based on their reliance on particular capability domains. This procedure 
would allow for a transition from a product-based taxonomy to a production 
technology-based taxonomy. Using this taxonomy, governments can target the 
development of capability domains (e.g., food processing, advanced materials, 
mechanics and control systems, ICT), rather than of particular industries defined in 
terms of the final product. Each one of these capability domains constitutes a platform 
of competencies, technologies, productive knowledge and experiences that can be 
deployed in a plurality of sectors. For example, these days the agro-food sector draws 
not just on traditional food processing capabilities (e.g., cleaning, cooking, canning), 
but also on the capabilities in mechanics and in control systems for packaging, on ICT 
capabilities for food tracking and, finally, on the capabilities in advanced materials for 
smart packaging. By nurturing the development of complementary sets of capabilities, 
the scope for technological innovation within and across sectors can be increased and 





Since the 1980s, the dramatic restructuring of the global production system has been 
coupled with the process of increasing financialization. Financialization has been 
particularly strong among the advanced economies of the Anglo-Saxon variety of 
capitalism (Andreoni et al., 2019c; Lazonick, 2014; Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000). 
It is now widely acknowledged that, in these economies, the recent financial crisis has 
only been the latest manifestation of structural imbalances resulting from widespread 
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financialization (Blankenburg and Palma, 2009). More recently, the financialization 
process has also affected a number of developing countries, as revealed by declining 
and increasingly volatile trends in investment/GDP ratios (even among fast catching-
up economies, like China), wages contraction, and the growing share of finance in 
GDP (Storm, 2018; UNCTAD, 2016).  
Financialization is a multi-faceted phenomenon, as it operates at different 
levels (corporation, country, world) and involves different actors (individual savers 
and borrowers, corporate managers, financial investors, banks, as well as 
governments). As a result, the mechanisms through which the global economy has 
become increasingly financialized are various, span across more than one country, 
and tend to reinforce each other. This is why addressing the problem of 
financialization is extremely difficult from a single-country policy perspective. For 
example, even assuming that a government has the policy space to reduce the 
instability of capital flows (which is often not the case), the same government might 
not be able to stop more fundamental processes of financialization occurring at the 
level of foreign corporations. Today, TNCs have become new channels through which 
financialization practices are transmitted, through their control structures and 
strategies. This also means that, through these various transmission mechanisms, even 
countries at earlier stages of economic development (without a developed financial 
market) can become over-financialized, especially because they lack the regulatory 
capabilities. Therefore, without tackling these multiple dimensions of the same 
financialization process and without understanding the different ways in which it 
affects industrial development (in particular, capital investments), even the most well-
designed industrial policy will be ineffective. 
Let us start looking at financialization from the level of the corporation. At 
this level, financialization manifests itself in five ways: (1) short-termism in corporate 
control and in investment strategy; (2) increasing distribution of profits through 
dividends and stock buy-backs; (3) increasing reliance/dependence on external 
finance; (4) increasing importance of financial activities by non-financial 
corporations, including stock buy-backs; (5) increasing size of the financial sector. 
The bottom line of this financialization process is the breaking of the profit–
investment nexus, which has driven the emergence of the ‘modern business 
enterprise’ and the industrialization of today’s developed countries.  
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Historically, during the first wave of big business development, from the mid-
19th century to the 1920s, finance capital did not play a critical role, with the 
exception of the financing of infrastructure (primarily railroads and 
telecommunications). Industrial firms increased their scale mainly by re-investing 
profits and by restructuring operations, such as mergers to integrate production and 
distribution (O’Sullivan, 2016). Starting from the 1980s, this profit–investment nexus 
started weakening and corporations became increasingly financialized. The increasing 
globalization and fragmentation of production, the refocusing of TNCs on core 
businesses, and the increasing power of institutional investors, shifted corporate 
strategies from the old logic of ‘retaining and investing’ to one of ‘downsizing and 
distributing’. The emergence and the subsequent dominance of what came to be called 
‘shareholder value’ ideology (Lazonick, 2014; Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000) has 
been the culmination of corporate financialization, which has contributed to the 
financialization of the entire economy.   
 If we look at financialization at the country and the global levels, it has been 
widely stressed that the international financial architecture is incapable of channelling 
financial resources in the right direction — from the centre to the periphery, as well as 
into the productive sectors of the economy. Not only has the unregulated global 
financial system been ineffective in making resources available where needed, it has 
in fact exposed countries to instability in financial capital flows and macroeconomic 
shocks (Chang, 2007a). The financialization of the global economy and the lack of 
global regulations in the areas of capital flows, as well as tax avoidance and evasion, 
have weakened governments in both developed and developing countries. In 
particular, the capacity of governments to set and maintain favourable 
macroeconomic conditions for growth, to finance infrastructural investments, and to 
run effective industrial policy has been declining dramatically as a result of 
financialization. Given that public investments tend to play a catalytic role for private 
investments (crowding-in effect), the reduced capacity of government to make 
investments (or support private investments through industrial policy), when 
combined with the financialization of corporations, has pushed economies towards a 
spiral of dis-investment and de-accumulation. This lack of investment in the future is 
a fundamental threat to the very reproduction of the society as well as the economy.  
Industrial policy in the form of corporate governance reform, geared towards 
increasing productive investments, can play an important role in reversing the vicious 
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cycle caused by financialization. However, given the systemic nature of the 
financialization phenomenon, it is destined to fail if it is not aligned with regulations 
at the different levels discussed above, that is, corporate governance, the domestic 
financial market, and the global financial system. 
 
 
Imperialism, Old and New 
 
All economic policies have an international power dimension. For example, the rich 
countries have used the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other global financial 
organizations that they control in order to impose ‘monetarist’ macroeconomic 
policies on the developing countries in macroeconomic trouble, while conducting 
more ‘Keynesian’ policies when they face similar problems themselves (Chang, 
2007a: Ch. 7). However, nowhere is this international power imbalance more 
prominent than in the area of industrial policy, whose scope has been very explicitly 
and clearly constrained by the imperialist policies of the stronger countries in the last 
three centuries.  
Up until the end of World War II, these actions took the most blatant forms in 
the colonies (see Chang, 2002: 51–53). First, certain high-value manufacturing 
activities were banned outright in the colonies. Second, exporting activities by 
producers in the colonies were restricted in order to minimize competition with the 
producers in the colonizing countries. Third, in the colonies, raw material production 
was strongly encouraged through subsidies and other policy measures, with the 
explicit purpose of making manufacturing activities less attractive. Fourth, between 
the early 19th century and the mid-20th century, ‘unequal treaties’ were forced upon 
the weaker countries that were not formally colonies. Among other things, these 
treaties deprived them of the right to set their own tariffs (known as ‘tariff 
autonomy’), which made it impossible for them to provide infant industry protection 
by allowing only very low, uniform tariff rates (3–5 per cent) for revenue purposes. 
These treaties also introduced the concept of ‘most favoured nation’, which enabled 
all the countries that signed an (unequal) treaty with a weaker country to get a more 
favourable treatment, if one of them manages to extract it, thus allowing the stronger 
countries to bully the weaker ones collectively. These treaties lasted well into the 20th 
century for some countries. 
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With the end of the unequal treaties by the 1920s and the subsequent wave of 
decolonization between the 1940s and the 1970s, the imperialist countries 
significantly loosened their grip on the developing countries. The new global regime 
of trade, embodied in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), put only 
mild restrictions on the trade policy of developing countries, with the choice not to 
sign up to the agreements that they don’t want (so-called plurilateralism). Within this 
relatively permissive framework, the need for infant industry protection and other 
industrial policy measures was widely recognized, although the free trade ideology re-
asserted itself soon enough.  
The 1980s was the turning point. Following the Third World Debt Crisis of 
1982, IMF–World Bank Structural Adjustment Programmes — which emphasized 
fiscal austerity, trade liberalization, deregulation and privatization — were rolled out 
across the developing world. The collapse of the Soviet bloc in the late 1980s ushered 
in an era of free market triumphalism, further strengthening the ideological 
dominance of free market, free trade economics worldwide.  
These shifts were institutionally consolidated in the 1990s. In 1994, the 
NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement), the first free trade agreement 
including developed countries and a developing country, was signed. The NAFTA 
also contained an important new provision, known as chapter 11, on the Investor State 
Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanism, which took the unprecedented step of 
allowing corporations to directly sue host governments for damaging their profits 
through regulation. In 1995, following the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of trade 
talks, the GATT was transformed into the WTO. In contrast to the plurilateral 
principle of the GATT, the WTO demanded that all member countries sign up to all 
the agreements (the so-called ‘single undertaking’ provision), which were not only 
more restrictive than those under the GATT but also covered new areas, most notably 
intellectual property rights (TRIPs) and regulations on foreign investment (TRIMs). 
The 1990s also saw the rapid spread of investment treaties. The number of bilateral 
free trade agreements also started increasing in the 1990s and exploded in the 2000s; 
they numbered around 50 in the mid-1990s but there are now over 250 of them.5 As a 
result, the developing countries are today much more constrained in the use of many 
                                                          
5 See: http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2015/10/global-trade-graphics  
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industrial policy measures that were the standard fares of the early post-colonial era 
between the mid-1940s and the mid-1970s.  
However, it is important to note that, unless developing countries have signed 
bilateral agreements with the rich countries (especially the US), there is still a 
considerable amount of ‘policy space’ (for further details on the points below, see 
Chang et al., 2016: Ch. 5, section 5.1). First, there are industrial policy measures that 
are basically domestic in nature and thus not subject to international agreements. 
Targeted infrastructural investments, subsidies for (or public provision of) worker 
training or R&D, government procurement programmes, tax incentives for physical 
investments, and the strategic use of state-owned enterprises are only some of the 
more prominent examples of ‘domestic’ policies.6  
Second, many industrial policy measures that are international in nature can 
still be used. Some policy measures have no international restrictions because no 
international consensus has evolved around them. Also, ambiguities in certain rules or 
their application can create further scope for pushing certain policies until they are 
detected or challenged. Third, there is still room for using tariffs. The WTO 
requirement is only that its members ‘bind’ (that is, set the upper limit to) at least 
some of their tariffs. As a result, many poorer members of the WTO have bound 
virtually none of their tariffs, while many of those who have bound their tariffs have 
done so at quite high levels. Given that the current levels of tariffs in most countries 
are well below their bound levels, these countries could raise tariffs substantially, if 
they wanted. Countries can also apply extra tariffs or even quantitative restrictions to 
address balance of payments problems, whether economy- or sector-wide. 
Fourth, with regard to subsidies, the WTO categorically bans only those for 
export promotion (except for the LDCs and some selected developing countries) and 
those requiring local contents. All subsidies can be challenged in a WTO dispute 
(‘actionable’ in the WTO parlance), but the procedures for subsidy disputes are rather 
complicated and time-consuming, so even an ‘illegal’ subsidy can remain in force for 
                                                          
6 There is an ’Agreement on Government Procurement’, but it is ‘a plurilateral agreement 
within the framework of the WTO, meaning that not all WTO members are parties to the 
Agreement’, as the WTO website itself describes 
(https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/gp_gpa_e.htm). At the moment, only 20 
parties comprising 48 WTO members (that is, counting the 28 members of the EU as ‘a 
party’) have signed up to it. They are all developed countries, except for a few peripheral 
European countries (e.g. Moldova, Ukraine, Montenegro). 
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several years before it is challenged (if it ever is) and ruled illegal. And indeed, 
another few years may be needed for the accumulation of the damage that makes it 
eligible for a WTO dispute.  
Fifth, under the WTO, it has become more difficult to regulate foreign direct 
investment (FDI), due to the Trade Related Investment Measures agreement and the 
GATS (General Agreement on Trade in Services) agreement. However, the TRIMs 
agreement only prohibits domestic content requirements and foreign exchange 
balancing requirements (that is, the requirement that a foreign-invested company 
should not run a ‘trade deficit’). Regulations regarding joint venture, technology 
transfer, or limitations on foreign equity ownership can still be used. As for the 
GATS, countries are required to accept restrictions on their FDI regulation only in 
sectors in which they have made ‘commitments’ — most countries, especially 
developing countries, have made only a limited number of commitments in relation to 
the service industries. 
To sum up, while the restrictions on industrial policy by developing countries 
have become strengthened in the last couple of decades, this does not mean that 





Since the 18th century, the debate surrounding industrial policy has been one of the 
most important in the political economy of development. The debate has often been 
ideologically highly charged, but recent developments in the real world and in 
academia have opened up space for a more balanced, pragmatic debate. This article 
contributes to this new phase of the debate by raising some neglected issues and 
discussing the changes in reality that demand reformulation of the theories behind 
industrial policy.   
Starting from the firm level, we have shown that the problem of commitments 
under uncertainty is a key issue in industrial policy, as it affects investments in 
specific productive capabilities, the latter being one of the most fundamental drivers 
                                                          
7 See Chang (2007b) for further discussion on policy space in historical perspective, and 
Andreoni et al. (2019a) for an analysis of policy space for the achievement of the Sustainable 
Development Goals. 
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of capitalist accumulation and technological change. Then we moved to analyse 
various processes of learning in production and the critical relationship between 
agency and material structures within the realm of production. We highlighted how 
learning is the main source of value creation and how it cuts across various firms and 
sectors. Third, we showed how the dynamics triggered by the commitments under 
uncertainty and learning processes within firms are linked in a circular and 
cumulative relationship with demand. In this respect, we highlighted how successful 
industrialization is possible only under certain macroeconomic conditions. Finally, we 
focused on the political economy dimension, specifically the issue of managing the 
conflicts that arise from industrial policy. The type of conflict management has 
important implications for the ‘inclusiveness’ of the industrial development process.  
Despite differences across countries in terms of their stages and levels of 
industrialization, their macroeconomic regimes, and their political economy settings, 
the three set of neglected issues we have focused on are and will remain of paramount 
importance. In fact, the problem of committing resources in specialized assets has 
become even more critical with recent technological changes that have made 
technological cycles shorter, and with the opportunities (and challenges) posed by 
digitalization. Similarly, the need to address long-term grand challenges, like climate 
change, calls for massive and coordinated investments in energy systems, production 
practices and mobility. The achievement of these global transformations still depends 
on micro-level structural changes in productive organizations and government 
interventions in creating new worlds of production as well as managing industrial and 
social restructuring. The latest industrial policies launched by leading industrial 
nations, like ‘Industry 4.0’ in Germany and ‘Made in China 2025’, build on these 
foundational principles and, while being nationally focused, have major global 
implications. 
The second part of the article discussed these new insights in order to help us 
better understand three critical features of today’s global economy that affect 
industrial policy. First, we analysed how the transformation of the global production 
system has led to a new accumulation regime as well as a new dynamics of value 
creation and capture. In this regard, we looked at the combination of vertical 
disintegration and horizontal concentration of global businesses, the increasing 
fuzziness of standard sectoral boundaries, and the increasing need to understand 
production processes in terms of capability domains, rather than final products. 
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Second, we analysed the financialization of the global economy. We showed how the 
financialization of corporations as well as of the overall financial system has led to a 
spiral of underinvestment, thus threatening the very reproduction of capitalist 
economies. Finally, we looked at the extent to which countries have been able to 
make policy responses to these new challenges within the new global policy regime. 
The analysis focused on the distinctive features of what we can call a new form of 
imperialism.  
These three global transformations are establishing new interdependences 
across national industrial policies, in some cases even leading to unexpected and 
unintended consequences. For example, given the global value chain structures, 
governments have lost control over the ultimate effects of trade wars. The main 
beneficiaries of the trade war between the US and China may be countries like 
Vietnam and Ethiopia, possible relocation destinations for US firms currently 
operating in China. Similarly, with the emergence of trillion-dollar companies like 
Apple, Amazon or Microsoft and increasing concentration in high-value 
manufacturing sectors like aerospace (Airbus and Boeing), some companies have 
acquired an unprecedented market power but, even more importantly, have enormous 
amount of resources at their disposal, many times larger than government industrial 
policy budgets. As a result of financialization, corporate governance and investment 
decisions of these companies can be captured by short-term oriented financial 
interests, leading to declining investments and missed opportunities for innovation — 
what some have called ‘predatory value extraction’ (Lazonick and Shin, 2019).  
From the 1990s until the global financial crisis of 2008, the industrial policy 
debate remained constrained by ideological battles, and important opportunities for 
research and policy development were lost in many countries. The last decade has 
witnessed a strong resurgence of interest in industrial policy, though the debate has 
quickly entered a potential diminishing-returns territory, as it usually involves 
revisiting the issues of the old debate using new terminologies (Andreoni and Chang, 
2019). This article has attempted to provide the building blocks of a new theory of 
industrial policy that we hope will help the industrial policy debate to enter the 
territory of increasing returns. 
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